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Abstract  
The study examines the relationship between audit committee characteristics and real earnings 
management and test whether this constrains real earnings management activities. With the use of 
cross-sectional data of 100 companies rated by the Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group Malaysia 
as best in corporate governance practices in 2011, a multiple regression analysis is carried out. The 
study found that none of the variables of the audit committee characteristics could constrain real 
earnings management. The study adds to the existing literature on earnings management, particularly 
real earnings management.  




1.0 Introduction  
The studies of Ball and Brown (1968) and Beaver (1968) shed light on the 
importance of accounting earnings information as a means of providing valuable 
information to investors and other stakeholders. The relevance of these accounting 
earnings encourage managers to manage and distort earnings at the expense of 
shareholders (Rahman & Ali, 2006). Moreover, the financial statement is expected to 
provide relevant information on uncertainty, timing of cash flow  and use for relevant 
purposes such as investment decisions for local and foreign investors as well as 
compensation policies (Abed, Al-Attar, & Suwaidan, 2012; Bernard & Skinner, 
1996; Healy & Palepu, 2001; Roychowdhury, 2006). As such the quality of earnings 
reported is fundamental to investors. However, the irregularities and 
inappropriateness of reported earnings, particularly earnings management, make 
investors sceptical about the information and reported earnings provided by 
companies (Haw, Ho, & Li, 2011; Liu, 2012). In recent times, there is a growing 
concern in accounting and finance literature that companies engage in earnings 
management using two different strategies (Cohen, Dey, & Lys, 2008; Cohen & 
Zarowin, 2010; Zang, 2012). Much of academic literature has focused on 
discretionary accruals (Dechow, Ge, & Schrand, 2010; Jones, 1991;) while others 
focus on real earnings management (Gunny, 2010; Graham, Harvey, & Rajgopal, 
2005; Roychowdury, 2006). 
 
Being among the preparers of the reported earnings, managers and auditors of 
a company play important roles which may be influenced by the economic settings of 
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the environment in which they operate. Prior studies have considered the role of audit 
committee characteristics in their ability to mitigate earnings management (Becker, 
Defond, Jiambalvo, & Subramanyam, 1998; Francis & Krishnan, 1999), but little is 
known about the role of audit committee characteristics in relation to real earnings 
management, which is more difficult to detect, compared to accrual earnings 
management. Chi, Lisic, and Pevzner (2011) document that managers employ real 
earnings management practices when there are high quality auditors. Admitting the 
fact that an audit committee owns the audit process is still a subject of concern 
considering the recent corporate accounting problem in 2012, e.g., Groupon in the 
US and Olympus, Satyam, Transmile and Megan in Asia. Indeed, one of the causes 
has been attributed to lack of financial expertise in the audit committee of most of 
these companies leading to the suggestion that members of the audit committee 
should be encouraged to have financial certification to ensure their effectiveness 
(Grenier, Ballou, & Phillip, 2012; Kalelkar & Nwaeze, 2011).  
Despite the importance of an audit committee in a company, the relationship 
is still inconsistent and controversial in corporate governance literature. Therefore, 
this study tends to further examine the impact of audit committee characteristics on 
earnings management, in particular, real earnings management. In this respect, the 
study decomposes the real earnings management following what previous 
researchers have done using the three measures of real earnings management. Based 
on the specific period, the study provides evidence that none of the audit committee 
characteristics variables such as audit member financial expertise, gender, meetings 
and  independence is related to real earnings management. The study adds to the 
existing literature on earnings management, particularly real earnings management in 
a country characterised by increase in information asymmetry and earnings opacity. 
The study is of significant importance because it will strengthen the role of an audit 
committee against misappropriation of shareholder capital, specifically the new 
means used by managers to manage earnings considering the various amendments in 
the corporate governance code.  
Prior to the Asian financial crisis in 1997/98, the then Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange (KLSE) now Bursa Malaysia required companies listed on the exchange to 
establish an audit committee. However, no emphasis was laid on its compliance until 
the introduction of the Malaysia code of corporate governance in 1999 and made 
effective in 2002. In addition, the 2007 code also highlights the criteria for the 
appointment, composition and the frequency of meetings of the audit committee. On 
issues related to an audit committee, the audit committee members are expected to be 
among the members and composed of not less than three members. Indeed, they are 
expected to be non-executive directors and one of the members must belong to the 
Malaysia Institute of Accountants with three years’ experience thereof, and 
specifically must have financial expertise.  Iyer, Bamber and Griffin (2013) find that 
when designating an auditing committee, accounting certification and audit 
committee experience are considered highly by the board of directors while even 
prior experience as a CEO does not depict financial expertise. Indeed, the chairman 
of the committee must also be an independent director All these are necessary to 





The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the related 
literature. Section 3 entails the hypotheses development, while Section 4 provides the 
research design used in achieving the objectives of the study. Then Section 5 
discusses the analysis and empirical results and Section 6 provides a conclusion to 
the study. 
Section 2 Literature review 
2.1 Earnings Managemnet 
Earnings management involves management wrongdoings, mischief,  use of 
discretions in reporting accounting numbers and structuring of transactions, to 
influence the financial information that could mislead shareholders and stakeholders 
on the underlying economic performance of the company or contractual outcomes 
that depends on accounting numbers (Healy & Wahlen, 1999). Empirical evidence 
has shown that managers manipulate earnings using different strategies (Cohen & 
Zarowin, 2010; Sun & Rath, 2010) and these strategies have some consequence and 
affect users of the financial statement, especially investors (Ibrahim, Xu, & Rogers, 
2011).  
However, the most discussed strategy is the accrual based earnings 
management, where managers use accounting choices and estimation among the 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) (Dechow et al, 2010; Healy & 
Wahlen, 1999). However, a survey conducted by Graham et al. (2005) document that 
media and analyst attention have been mostly confined to accrual type of earnings 
management, whereas managers have tried to shift to real earnings management, 
which has not received much media attention in the post-Sarbanes-Oxley era. 
Roychowdhury (2006) and Gunny (2009) identify that managers deviate from 
normal operating practices in an attempt to meet earnings target when making 
operating decisions. These are achieved through indiscriminate grant of price 
discount in order to boost sales, cutting down discretionary expenses to increase 
earnings and overproduction to result in a lower cost of goods sold. Sometimes  
managers employ real activities manipulation when there are difficulties such as high 
quality auditors in using the accrual earnings management (Chi, et al., 2011).  
In addition, managers’ opportunistic behaviour is likely to influence earnings 
management (Cohen, et al., 2008). The likely aims are for incentives and private 
gains (Liu, 2012), bonus plan, debt covenants and to influence contractual outcome. 
In a nutshell, earnings management makes it difficult for shareholders make 
informed decisions because the real performance of the company is unknown. For 
example, a capital market is said to be efficient when prices of securities are a 
reflection of information flow, since financial information is used in setting security 
prices.  
 
2.2 Agency theory 
The proponents of agency theory Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama 
(1980) provide some measures that could resolve the conflicts that arise between 
shareholders and managers. Eisenhardt (1989) concludes that corporate governance 
mechanisms could play a significant role in reducing information asymmetry and 
moral hazards. For example, the audit committee played fundamental roles in 
constraining earnings management (Marra, Mazzola, & Prencipe, 2011) particularly, 





likely to employ independent judgement in monitoring the management, financial 
reporting activities and ensuring that the financial information is transparent and not 
misleading. In a country like the UK, the presence of the audit committee is 
voluntary and either their presence or absence has no impact on earnings 
management activities (Peasnell, Pope, & Young, 2005), while Marra et al. (2011) 
find a statistical negative relationship between the audit committee and earnings 
management. The agency problem occurs as a result of conflict of interest between 
the principal otherwise known as shareholders and agent (managers). Aligning the 
interest of both is what corporate governance stands for.  
The existence of an audit committee is to ensure a sound internal control 
system so that the financial information is reliable. The audit committee meets 
regularly with the auditors to review the financial statement process and ensure an 
array of communication between the external auditor and the board (Beasley, 
Carcello, Hermanson & Neal, 2010; Kang & Kim, 2012; Xie, Davidson, & DaDalt, 
2003). The audit Committee also plays a mediating role in resolving client dispute 
(Johl, Jubb & Houghton, 2007). In fact, the audit committee characteristics could 
also be a determining factor that might guarantee its effectiveness in order to serve as 
financial monitor (Abbot, Parker, & Peters, 2004) thereby improves the quality of 
financial information released by the company (Carcello, Hollingsworth, & Neal, 
2006). 
 
Section 3.0 Hypothesis Development 
3.1 Audit committee 
Prior researchers have pointed out certain characteristics needed of the audit 
committee (Chi et al., 2011; Iyer et al., 2013; Marra et al., 2011; Saleh, Iskandar & 
Rahmat, 2007). Salleh and Stewart (2012) find that an audit committee with industry 
and financial expertise serves a mediating role in resolving client dispute. Moreover, 
audit committee effectiveness is determined by the larger proportion of independent 
directors (Chen, Moroney & Houghton, 2005), financial background of members 
(Defond et al., 2005) and the frequency of committee meetings. (Xie et al., 2003). 
 Numerous empirical studies have focused on the impact of audit committee 
characteristics on several conceptions such as financial reporting quality and 
earnings quality (Johl, Johl, Subramaniam & Cooper, 2013; Nelson & Devi, 2013), 
market announcement effect (Defond et al., 2005), earnings management (Klein, 
2002) internal control weakness and earnings restatement (Agrawal & Chadha 2005). 
Agrawal and Chadha (2005) find that existence of the audit committee is 
uncorrelated with earnings restatement. Likewise Alves (2011) and Peasnell et al., 
(2005) find no indication that an audit committee influences a manager's action in 
engaging in earnings management. Conversely, Chi et al., (2011) documents a 
positive relation between audit quality and real earnings management. 
 
3.2 Audit committee independence 
The independence of an audit committee allows the audit committee 
members to be effective in carrying out their functions on oversights. Prior studies 
such as Abbott et al. (2004) identify a negative relationship between audit committee 
independence and earnings restatement, an indication that, the existence of an audit 





ensure that financial information provided is fair and reliable. Saleh et al. (2007) 
document that audit committee independence mitigates earnings management 
practices. They extend further that an audit committee would be more effective if all 
the members on the committee are 100% independent from management.  
However, Sahlan (2011) found that audit committee independence is 
positively related with discretionary accruals at 10% level. This indicates that, an 
increase in independent directors sitting on the audit committee lead to an increase in 
the incidence of earnings management. Rahman and Ali (2006) reveal that there is no 
significant relationship between independence of an audit committee and the 
incidence of earnings management. Agrawal and Chadha (2005) suggest that with 
the inclusion of independent audit committee members with financial expertise is 
associated lower level of earnings restatement. In addition, Abbott, Parker, and 
Presley (2012) suggest that having a female representative as a member of an audit 
committee could serve as a boost to audit committee effectiveness.  
On the other hand, studies on real earnings management have also indicated 
some associations. Visvanathan (2008) found that audit committee independence is 
insignificant in constraining real earnings management. Nevertheless, it was found 
that a company with an internal audit committee is associated with a lower level of 
earnings management. Based on the foregoing, the study predicts that the association 
between audit committee independence and real earnings management activities is 
negative. 
3.3 Audit committee expertise  
The existence of an audit committee alone is not an automatic avenue for 
good monitoring of companies, unless the members of the audit committee are not 
only independent but also have the financial expertise to be in the committee 
(Sahlan, 2011). Abbott et al. (2004) identified that having at least one member with 
financial expertise play an important role as a member of an audit committee depicts 
a negative relationship with earnings restatement. Also, Nelson and Devi (2013) and 
Xie et al. (2003) conclude that the presence of accounting experts and non-
accounting experts are significant in constraining earnings management. While Saleh 
et al. (2007) find that companies who have members with financial expertise on their 
committees have less earnings management compared to other companies without 
such expertise.  In a related study, Zhang, Zhou and Zhou (2007) find that an audit 
committee with less members holding financial expertise relate to internal control 
weaknesses. On the other hand, Mohamad, Rashid and Shawtari (2012) pinpoint that 
even with the inclusion of an individual with financial expertise to sit as a board 
member on an audit committee could still lead to a soar in earnings management 
practices. Likewise, Rahman and Ali (2006) document that there exists no 
relationship between audit committee competence and earnings management. The 
presence of members with investment and financial background boost the committee 
members in their ability to detect earnings management. Based on  the 
aforementioned, there is a negative association between expertise of members of an 







3.4 Audit committee size 
Empirical literature has shown that the size of an audit committee has an 
impact on earnings management practices, but the significant effect of audit 
committee size as a monitoring role in constraining earnings management has been 
inconsistent. Saleh et al. (2007) found that audit committee size is effective in 
constraining earnings management. Xie et al. (2003) documented that an average 
audit committee composed of three members, albeit an indication of effective 
financial monitoring role, is able to influence the internal and external audit process. 
However, Visvanathan (2008) opines that the audit committee size is insignificant in 
constraining real earnings management. Hence, there is a negative association 
between audit committee size and real earnings management. 
3.5 Audit committee meeting 
Saleh et al. (2007) suggest that an audit committee should meet in a year 
without the presence of the board executives and that frequency of meetings held has 
an impact on earnings management. Empirically, companies that have more meetings 
recorded a lower level of earnings management. On the average, audit committees 
are expected to meet 4-times a year with a size of around 3 to 4 members. Most of 
the companies sampled in the study operated meetings 9 to 13 times in the year 2002. 
Abbott et al. (2004) document that audit committee members that meet at least four 
times in a year reveal a negative relationship between audit committee meetings and 
real earnings statements.  
On the other hand, Thiruvadi (2012) identified that with a female 
representative as a member on the audit committee, there is a more likely possibility 
for them to meet often. The audit committee needs to meet frequently for there to be 
an effective monitoring and quick responding to issues and latest developments. 
More so, there may be a positive outcome of having a female representative on audit 
committees and its impact on meetings, since they have a different pattern of 
behaviour. It can be expected that this would improve corporate governance practice 
and would negatively have an impact on earnings management. Nevertheless,  
findings on its impact in mitigating real earnings management in an empirical study 
by Visvanathan (2008) show that audit committee meetings are not significant for 
two measures (abnormal production cost and abnormal cash flows) out of three 
measures of real earnings management. This is an indication that it constrains 
abnormal discretionary expenses only, which can be conclusive, except that it is a 
little bit significant in mitigating real earnings management activities. Thus, there is a 
negative association between the audit committee meeting, female representative and 
real earnings management activities. 
Section 4 Research design   
4.1 Sample Selection  
In order to be able to achieve the objectives of the study, the sample size is 
based on selected 100 companies that have been rated in the annual report of 
Minority Shareholders Watchdog Group in 2011 as best companies in corporate 
governance practices. The report was drawn from the annual Malaysian Corporate 





disclosure, financial stability and corporate social responsibility efforts. In addition, 
all these companies are listed on the Main market of Bursa Malaysia. 
Since the main focus of the study is to investigate the influence of audit 
committee characteristics on real earnings management, in accordance with the best 
corporate governance practices as introduced in 2007 with an effective date in 2009 
and with the latest corporate governance code that public listed companies are 
expected to comply with. The study is also restricted to non-finance companies only, 
consistent with (Cohen, et al., 2008; Kang & Kim, 2012; Visvanathan, 2008) on 
study related to real earnings management activities. Finance companies are 
excluded because they use a different accruals method (Park & Shin, 2004) and have 
unique disclosure requirements that makes it difficult for them to engage in earnings 
management, since they are highly regulated and are governed by Banking and other 
Financial Institutions Act (Hashim & Devi, 2008; He, Wrights, Evans, & Crowe , 
2009; Jalil & Rahman, 2010; Mohamad, et al., 2012; Pae & Quinn, 2009). 
4.2 Dependent variable 
  Following the development of real earnings management, measurement by 
Cohen et al. (2008) and Rocychowdhury (2006), find that the level of accrual 
earnings management decreases while real earnings management increases 
significantly after the passage of SOX in 2002. Prior researchers use abnormal cash 
flow from operations, abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary 
expenses as a proxy for real earnings management (Cohen, et al., 2008; Cohen & 
Zarowin, 2010; Graham, et al., 2005; Kang & Kim, 2012). In line with these prior 
researchers, the present study uses these three mechanics as proxies to show real 
earnings management exists. The study by Rocychowdhury (2006) examine real 
earnings base on three aspects. The first approach is sales manipulation, whereby 
excessive price discount or lenient credit terms are given so as to increase the sales 
figure. The second approach is discretionary expenses, which involves cutting 
discretionary expenses such as advertising, research and development and 
maintenance. The third approach is to overproduce, which entails production of more 
goods that leads to a high production level, i.e. overproduction to meet expected 
demand, which subsequently lead to reduction in fixed overhead cost per unit. As 
such, it reduces the cost of goods sold and results in an increase in profit margin. 
More importantly, companies that engage in earnings management are likely to have 
more out of the three abnormalities.   
To derive the stated value for normal activities of the three divisions of real earnings 
management, a regression analysis is done on each of the models as developed by 
Roychowdhury (2006) and implemented by prior researchers. The abnormal level of 
each classification of real earnings management is the deviation from the predicted 
values of the corresponding industry year regression. For example, normal cash flow 
is subjected to a linear function of sales and changes in sales scaled by lagged total 
assets.  
Abnormal cash flow from operation =Actual cash flow from operation – Normal 
level of cash flow from operation using the estimated coefficient in equation 1. 
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Production cost is defined as the addition of cost of goods available for sale and 
change in inventory.  Production cost is a linear function of sales, assuming 
production cost occurred at the same time with sales. Denoted as       =       + 
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And the change in inventory is considered with equation (3) 
Change in inventory  
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While abnormal production cost is considered in the equation (4) 
Abnormal production cost 
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Finally, the abnormal level of discretionary expenses is considered in the equation 
(5) 
Abnormal level of discretionary expenses 
Discretionary expenses are a combination of research and development, advertising 
and selling and administrative expenses. 
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Where,     = Cash flow from operations, A= Total Asset,       = Total assets at the 
beginning of the year, S = Sales,      = Sales at the beginning of the year,       = 
lagged  change in sales, PROD = Production cost in the period t, COGS = Cost of 
goods sold in period t, INVENT= Inventory, DEXP= Discretionary expenses, which 
consist of selling general and administrative expenses and       is the error term. Also, 
At = Asset at the end of the period, St = Sales at the end of the period   





 Audit committee members' independence (AUDIND): The proportion of 
independent directors sitting on the audit committee to total committee 
member(Kang & Kim, 2012; Saleh, et al., 2007; Visvanathan, 2008). 
 Audit committee meetings(AUDMET): The number of audit committee 
meetings divided by total number of audit committee member (Mohamad, et 
al., 2012; Saleh, et al., 2007). 
 Audit committee size (AUDSIZE): The total number of members on an audit 
committee (Saleh, et al., 2007). 
 Audit committee expertise (AUDEXPT): The proportion of audit committee 
members that have financial expertise (Marra, et al., 2011; Saleh, et al., 
2007). 
 Women director (WMD): An indicator variable of “1” if a woman is among 
the audit committee member ((Brady, et al., 2011; Francoeur, et al., 2008). 
 Return on assets (ROA): Earnings before interest and tax divided by total 
assets(Kang & Kim, 2012; Rahman & Ali, 2006). 
 Company size (CSIZE): The natural logarithm of total assets (RM million) 
(Kang & Kim, 2012; Liu, 2012; Othman & Zeghal, 2006). 
 Financial Leverage (LEV): Total debt ( long and short-term debts) divided by 
total assets(Kang & Kim, 2012; Rahman & Ali, 2006). 
The study uses multiple regressions to examine whether audit committee 
characteristics influence real earnings management activities. The audit committee 
characteristics considered are, members’ independence, audit committee size, 
financial background and meetings. In furtherance to this, the model examines the 
relationships between audit committee characteristics and each division of real 
earnings management separately. In order to test its robustness, the study considers 
the outcome when a female is sitting on the board of an audit committee and other 
endogenous variables. Other variables that could influence earnings management as  
encapsulated by Roychowdhury (2006), Kang & Kim, (2012) and Visvanathan, 
(2008) considered in this study are a company’s leverage, return on assets and 
company size.  Mohamad et al. (2012); Rahman and Ali (2006) and Xie et al. (2003) 
reported that firm size are significantly related to discretionary accruals. This implies 
that smaller companies are subject to less scrutiny than bigger companies (Xie, et al., 
2003).  Since large companies are subjected to the eyes of the pubic and 
shareholders, they are associated with higher monitoring roles (He, et al., 2009; 
Kamardin & Haron, 2011).  This makes it difficult for managers of these companies 
to carry out any act that could distort financial information (Marra, et al., 2011). As 
suggested earlier, specific characteristics of a particular company are likely to 
influence managers’ choice of manipulating earnings. Astami and Tower (2006) 
documented that in the Asian Pacific region, companies that manipulate earnings 
with an earnings increasing approach are characterised by a lower level of financial 
leverage and higher investment opportunities. A company with one financial ordain 
or the other will be more interested in up-shooting earnings to avoid reporting loss 
which could cause financial dilemma (Alves, 2011; He, et al., 2009; Marra, et al., 
2011). On the other hand, a company that is highly indebted would be subjected to 
regulatory scrutiny. For these reasons a company with a higher leverage ratio would 
be negatively related to the level of earnings management  (Healy & Palepu, 2001; 





                                                
                                           
                                                 
                                           
                                                 
                                           
Section 5.0 Empirical results 
5.1 Real Earnings Management  
Table 1 presents the regression statistics of the model parameters used in deriving the 
normal level of activities before estimating the abnormal level of the three proxies of 
real-based earnings management activities as indicated in equation 1-5. The table 
shows that estimation for normal level of each of the proxies is derived at using the 
coefficient from the regression of each of the variables in each equation (Cohen & 
Zarowin, 2010; Hashemi & Rabiee, 2011; Kang & Kim, 2012; Roychowdhury, 2006; 
Visvanathan, 2008). As it can be seen from Table 1, the coefficient of production 
cost and cash flow from operation on sales are all positive, which is consistent with 
Kang and Kim (2012) and Roychowdhury (2006). In fact the p-value of both the 
production cost and discretionary expenses is statistically significant at 1%, which 
indicates a strong influence on production cost.  This implies that, the higher the 
change in sales the higher the production cost and operating cash flow from 
operation. In attestation to this result, Roychowdhury (2006) indicated that managers 
encourage activities that could lead to abnormally higher production costs and 
reduction in discretionary expenses in order to report higher earnings. 
In addition, the explanatory power of the model in estimating the normal level of 
operating activities is quite low for cash flow from operation and discretionary 
expenses and the adjusted R square for cash flow is 14 % and discretionary expenses 
are 12%. Although they are higher than the figure reported by  Kang and Kim (2012) 
at 4% and 2% respectively, but lower than what was reported by Roychowdhury 
(2006) at 45% and 38% respectively. On the other hand, the adjusted R square of 
production cost is at 82%, which is similar to that of Roychowdhury (2006) and 

































Table 1: Model parameters on the three proxies of real earnings management 
VARIABLES                           ACFO                                                          ADEXP                                                        APROD 
                                  COFF         t-statistics      P-Value       COFF        t-Statistics      P-Value     COFF           t-Statistics       P-Value 
INT 0.059*** 3.030 0.003 0.553 0.390 0.6975 -0.068 -1.292 0.200 
IA 4933.337 0.655 0.515 192094*** 3.445 0.001 -25302.83 -1.230 0.223 
SA 0.067*** 
 
3.863 0.000    0.771*** 15.653 0.000 
CSA -0.116* -1.899 
 
0.062    0.284 1.553 0.125 
SP    -1.332 -1.027 0.308    
CSP     0.071 0.359 0.721 
Adjusted R
2 
14.34% 11.69% 82.35% 
    
Notes: ***: significant at 1% level *: significant at 10% level 
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Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics on real earnings management proxies and 
the variable of interest. The mean value of abnormal production cost and abnormal 
discretionary expenses indicate a negative value of   -0.0003 and -0.0006 
respectively, while abnormal cash flow from operations has a positive mean value of 
0.0003. This is different from prior studies. For example Kang and Kim (2012) show 
a negative figure for both the mean value of abnormal production cost and abnormal 
cash flow from operations of -0.018 and -0.002, but a positive mean value for 
abnormal discretionary expenses at 0.000. 
The audit committee meetings (AUDMET) is the total number of meetings held 
during the financial year shows a mean value of 5 times, with a minimum and 
maximum value of 1 and 13 times respectively. The results on an audit committee 
variable indicate  that on average, audit committees of sample 78 companies hold 
four to five meetings in a financial year, which is consistent with Saleh et al. (2007) 
and Rahman and Ali (2006) who reported that on average, an audit committee meets 
four to five times in a financial year.  
The audit committee independence (AUDIND) represents the proportion of directors 
sitting on an audit committee who are independent. The highest percentage of 
independent directors sitting on a board is 89% and with a minimum number of 50%. 
This is consistent with Saleh et al. (2007) who reported that 73% of the members 
sitting on the board are independent, while Rahman and Ali (2006) reported that 
average independent members on the board of an audit committee are 68% and a 
maximum of 75%. This implies that the majority of the companies in the sample is 
highly compliant with the Malaysia Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG) and 
Bursa Malaysia listing requirements which indicate that a majority of audit 
committee members should be independent. 
Regarding audit committee expertise, 49% of directors sitting on the board of 
committees have either financial accounting background or are members of 
professional accounting bodies. This is similar to the findings of Saleh et al. (2007) 
who reported that around three to four members and a quarter of them have financial 
accounting background, an indication that average member of the audit committee 
are able to read and analyse financial statements. Notwithstanding, the mean value of 
audit committee size is 4, with a minimum value of 2 and maximum value of 6 in 
number, consistent with Rahman and Ali (2006). In line with the government policy 
on gender balance on boards of companies at 30% female, 19% of the audit 
committee members are female so far.  
In terms of separating the role of chief executive officer (CEO) and chairperson of a 
company, the mean value is 13%, with a minimum value of 0.00 and a maximum 
value of 1. Most of the prior studies’ maximum values are “1” (Sahlan, 2011) and on 
the real earnings management aspect (Hashemi & Rabiee, 2011). In fact, Sahlan 
(2011) stressed on the existence of CEO duality because of his/her power to 
influence and fulfil earnings management practices. The result is consistent with the 
stated requirements in the Malaysia Corporate Governance code and Bursa Malaysia 
listing requirements. This simply implies that the companies in the sample highly 





In addition, three extraneous variables were examined, leverage (LEV), returns on 
assets (ROA) and company size (CSIZE). It has been argued in literature that smaller 
companies are likely to engage in earnings management because much of the 
regulatory attention is entirely focused on larger companies (Rahman & Ali, 2006; 
Xie, et al., 2003). Normally, if the performance of the company is low, there is a 
likely possibility that  managers engage in earnings management (Sahlan, 2011). The 
mean value of such a company size is 6.46, with a minimum and maximum value of 
5.09 and 7.87 respectively. This is similar to a study conducted by Rahman and Ali 
(2006) who reported a mean value of 6.25, with a minimum and maximum value of 
5.20 and 7.51 respectively, which is slightly different from the study of Sahlan 
(2011) who reported a  mean value of 6.45, with a minimum and maximum value of 
5.15 and 8.01.  
The return on assets value (ROA) shows a mean value of -0.096 and with a minimum 
and maximum value of -0.19 and 0.48 respectively. This is similar to a study 
conducted by Rahman and Ali (2006) who reported a mean value of 0.089 with a 
minimum and maximum value of -0.10 and 0.63 respectively. On studies related to 
real earnings management, Kang and Kim (2012) reported on average of 0.056 return 
on assets of listed companies on the Korean stock exchange, with a minimum and 
maximum value of -0.221 and 0.352 respectively. Similarly, Hashemi and Rabiee 
(2011) reported on average of 0.2547 of return on assets of companies listed on 
Tehran stock exchange. 
The leverage mean value is 0.21, with a minimum and maximum value of 0.00 and 
0.61. This is similar to the study conducted by Rahman and Ali (2006) who reported 
a mean value of 0.21, with a minimum and maximum value of 0.0006 and 0.67 
respectively. This is slightly different from the study conducted in Korea by Kang 
and Kim (2012) who reported a mean value of 0.476, with a minimum and maximum 






Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of audit committee characteristics for a sample of 
78 Malaysian companies. 
 
 Range Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
  Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic 
ABPROD 2.41 -1.42 0.99 -0.0003 0.272 -0.969 11.244 
ABCFO 0.60 -0.26 0.34 0.0003 0.102 0.116 1.628 
ABDEXP 79.08 -19.80 59.28 -0.001 7.590 6.197 50.079 
AUDSIZE 4.00 2.00 6.00 3.539 0.688 0.884 1.226 
AUDMET 12.50 0.75 13.25 4.648 1.824 2.045 7.162 
AUDIND 0.83 0.50 1.33 0.890 0.154 -0.361 -0.499 
WMD 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.066 0.159 3.372 14.982 
AUDEXPT  
 
0.00 1.00 0.493 0.225 0.478 -0.304 
CEODUA  0.00 1.00 0.128 0.336 2.268 3.226 
ROA 66.74 -19.00 47.74 9.605 9.201 0.762 4.113 
CSIZE 2.78 5.09 7.87 6.464 0.623 0.040 -0.453 
LEV 0.61 0.00 0.61 0.2112 0.165 0.354 -0.609 
 
Table 3 presents the heteroskedasticity test using ARCH. Chi-Square of ARCH is far 
above 5%. Since these two results are above 5%, it indicates that there is no problem 
of heteroskedasticity in arriving at the final dependent variable. 
Table 3: Serial correlation and Heteroskedasticity test 
 
Variables ACFO  ADEXP APROD 
    
 Prob. Chi-Square Prob. Chi-Square Prob. Chi-Square 
    
Breusch-Godfrey 0.5762 0.9577 0.7925 
 
5.2 Pearson’s Correlation Matrix 
 
The Pearson’s Correlation Matrix results indicate that audit committee expertise, 
audit committee independence and having women on audit committee are positively 
correlated with abnormal production cost and abnormal discretionary expenses but 
negatively correlate with abnormal cash flow from operations. However, this is 
slightly contrary to prior studies that show a negative correlation between audit 
committee independence and abnormal cash flow from operation and abnormal 
production cost. 
In terms of audit committee meetings, it is negatively correlated with both abnormal 
production cost and abnormal discretionary expenses, while positively correlated 
with abnormal cash flow from operation. Conversely, Visvanathan (2008) reported a 
positive correlation between numbers of meetings held and abnormal production 





The audit committee size is negatively correlated with audit committee 
independence. Having a female as a member of the audit committee is negatively 
correlated with returns on assets. The audit committee meeting is positively 
correlated to the company size. This implies that the number of meetings increases 
depending on the size of the company. The returns on assets is negatively correlated 
to abnormal production cost and positively correlated to abnormal discretionary 
expenses. The return on assets is also negatively correlated with company size and 






Audit committee and real earnings management 
 
 ABPROD ABCFO ABDEXP AUDEXPT AUDIND  WMD CEODUA AUDMET AUDSIZE ROA CSIZE LEV 
ABPROD  1            
ABCFO  -0.519(**) 1           
ABDEXP  -0.001 0.242(*) 1          
AUDEXPT  0.160 -0.122 0.044 1         
AUDIND  0.010 -0.152 0.038 -0.040 1        
WMD  0.153 -0.184 0.006 0.135 -0.001 1       
CEODUA  -0.046 0.143 -0.076 -0.054 -0.046 0.105 1      
AUDMET  -0.077 0.126 -0.144 -0.130 -0.014 0.005 0.104 1     
AUDSIZE  0.040 -0.065 -0.023 -0.207 -0.319(**) 0.145 0.039 -0.024 1    
ROA  -0.488(**) 0.660(**) 0.172 -0.210 -0.083 - .246(*) 0.023 -0.053 -0.037 1   
CSIZE  0.065 -0.066 -0.031 0.073 -0.171 0.174 -0.007 0.350(**) 0.211 -0.323(**) 1  
LEV  0.113 -0.215 -0.070 0.029 0.076 -0.005 0.038 0.116 -0.055 -0.345(**) 0.462(**) 1 
              
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 






5.3 Multivariate analysis  
In achieving the expected outcome an ordinary least squares regression (OLS) is 
used since the model contains a dummy variable for one of the dependent variables 
and some control variables. This has been widely used by previous research both on 
accrual based earnings management (Rahman & Ali, 2006) and real based earnings 
management (Hashemi & Rabiee, 2011; Kang & Kim, 2012; Visvanathan, 2008). 
Tables 5 to 7 present the three models related to the association between audit 
committee characteristics and real earnings management activities. The adjusted R 
square for each of the models from Table 5 to Table 7 are statistically significant and 
are free from serial correlation and heteroskedasticity problem. The three models 
indicate negative relationships between the audit committee size, proportion of 
independent directors of the committee and the number of meetings held by the 
committee. But all these characteristics are not significant factors in constraining 
earnings management. The result is consistent with Visvanathan’s findings (2008).  
An audit committee member’s financial expertise is positively related to the entire 
three models yet they are not significant. This is contrary to  Saleh (2007) who 
reported that accounting knowledge of the audit committee members is insignificant 
in mitigating discretionary accruals earnings management activities. A simple 
explanation of this is that as the number of audit committee members from 
independent directors increases, earnings management through cutting down of 
expenses increases. This is against the expected signal.  In a related study on 
discretionary accrual earnings management by Rahman and Ali (2006) found no 
relationship between audit committee independence and discretionary accruals, 
whereas Sahlan (2011) reported a positive and significant relationship between audit 
committee independence and accrual earnings management. As suggested by Sahlan 
(2011), a possible reason for the result is that having audit committees in Malaysian 
















                                                





COEFFICIENT t-Statistics Prob 
   ? -0.147 -0.976 0.333 
       - -0.054 -0.976 0.333 
       - -0.057 -0.932 0.355 
       - 0.006 1.060 0.293 
       + 0.038 1.426 0.159 
        + 0.005 0.124 0.902 
    - -0.014 -0.600 0.552 
    - -0.050 -0.770 0.444 
    + 0.007 6.808 0.000 
      + 0.027 1.415 0.162 
R-squared 0.509    
Adjusted R-squared 0.443  22%  
Durbin-Watson stat   2.011  
F-statistic  7.721   





                                                 





COEFFICIENT t-Statistics Prob 
   ? -10.440 -0.680 0.499 
       - -0.691 -0.124 0.902 
       - 3.435 0.546 0.587 
       - -0.642 -1.177 0.243 
       - -1.376 -0.507 0.614 
        + 1.840 0.419 0.676 
    + 0.792 0.327 0.745 
    - -1.521 -0.229 0.820 
    + 0.179 1.607 0.113 
      + 1.384 0.717 0.476 
R-squared 0.070    
Adjusted R-squared -6%    
Durbin-Watson stat  1.925   
F-statistic   0.552  






Table 7 Result of estimation of abnormal production cost and audit committee 
                                                 





COEFFICIENT t-Statistics Prob 
   ? 0.446 0.909 0.366 
       - 0.057 0.323 0.747 
       - -0.072 -0.363 0.718 
       - -0.008 -0.475 0.637 
       - -0.027 -0.313 0.755 
        + 0.063 0.453 0.652 
    + 0.027 0.357 0.722 
    - -0.015 -0.073 0.942 
    - -0.014 -4.186 0.000 
      - -0.046 -0.757 0.452 
R-squared 26%    
Adjusted R-squared 16%    
Durbin-Watson stat   2.053  
F-statistic  2.606   






Issues related to earnings management practices has become an interesting topic 
among accounting and finance researchers, where corporate governance mechanisms 
have been identified as controlling measures in mitigating earnings management 
practices. Among these measures are the audit committee characteristics. The study 
also examines the association between six audit committee characteristics and real 
earnings management. The audit committee characteristics were considered 
individually on each set of real earnings management activities such as sales 
manipulation, overproduction, and cutting down expenses. The results indicate that 
the audit committee characteristics were found to be insignificant and less effective 
in constraining real earnings management activities. This is in contrast with the 
theoretical disposition of agency theory that corporate mechanism is expected to 
constrain manager activities misappropriating shareholders' wealth.  
Some possible reason for the insignificance of some of these variables is that 
media, regulatory and researchers' attention solely focussed on accrual based 
earnings management, not knowing that the managers have another strategy in 
managing earnings. Although most of these activities are outside the mandate of the 
audit committee, it provides a great avenue for policymakers and standard setters to 
look into the new strategy of engaging in earnings management by managers.  
Another reason could be the fact that real earnings management is difficult to 
detect and frequently the independent directors serving on a board may not be aware 
of this practice. It can be concluded that a lot needs to be done on the issues related 
to earnings management and those mechanisms that can curb such activity. One of 
the negative impacts of these activities is its long term effects on a company’s 
prospects. As such, this could be detrimental to shareholders as information provided 
by companies would be put in doubt. 
Some important limitations are attached to this study. First is that, the sample 
used is a small representation of the population as such the generalizability of the 
result is put into doubt. Also one cannot rule out calculation error that might arise 
during the measurement of real earnings management. Therefore, future research 
should expand the years for sampling and use a larger population, so that the result 
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